THE

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
AND

REVIEW.
OCTOBER, 1895,
As

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS FOR SEPTEMBER.
Edited by ARDEMUs

STEWART.

When the legislature has empowered the governor or other
officers of the state, on its behalf, to appoint an agent to
Attorney
and Client,
Contingent
Fee,
Claim by
State

prosecute a claim, and to fix his compensation, to

4e paidaut of any amogiut received therefrom, the
officers named can make a contract authorizing a
person to prosecute the said claim, and providing
that his compensation shall be a certain per cent.

of the amount collected by him, to be paid out of the proceeds
thereof; and such a contract will not be void, as against
ppblic policy, because it makes the payment of compensation
contingent on success: for the legislature, by the wording of
the statute, expressly authorized the making of such a contract: Davis v. Com~nionu'ealt/i, (Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts,) 41 N. E. Rep. 292.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recently rendered
a very peculiar decision in regard to the use of bicycles, holding, in Commonwealtz v. Forrest, 32 Atl. Rep.
Bicyclers,
652, (1) That under the act of Pennsylvania of
Ridingon
Sidewalks,
1889, May 7 ; P. L. I Io, § 3, which makes it a
Liabilityto
prosecution penal offence for any person to wilfully " ride or
drive any horse or other animal," on a sidewalk, and that of
I 89,April 23; P. L. 44, § i,which provides that bicyclers shall
be subject to the same restrictions as are prescribed by law in
the case of persons using carriages drawn by horses, one who
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rides a bicycle on a sidewalk is subject to the punishment prescribed for a violation of the former act; (2) That in a prosecution for riding a bicycle on a sidewalk it is no defence that
the informer contributed nothing to the original construction
of the sidewalk, or did not aid in keeping it in repair; nor that
the sidewalk was on land appropriated by a turnpike company, when the latter consented to such use of its land; nor
that the company consented to defendant's riding on the sidewalk, when the sidewalk was constructed and used as such
along the public highway; nor that defendant and others
using similar vehicles regularly rode on the sidewalk without
complaint.
It is difficult to discover in the opinion of the court any
,sufficient grounds for such a decision. It rests entirely upon
the supposed parity of the subject-matter of the two acts; but
this is a pure assumption. In the first place, the act of April
23 makes bicyclers subject only to the restrictions imposed on
horsemen,-not to their liabilities. These two things are by
no means the same; granting that a penal liability implies a
restriction, a mere prohibition does not imply a penal liability;
and it is the restriction, not the liability, to which the bicycler
is made subject. This is very cleverly dodged by the court,
as follows: "The first-named act [May 7] imposed a penalty
upon the driver of a horse who should wilfully drive him
upon any sidewalk in any township within the commonwealth. The last-named act [April 23] subjected the bicycle
rider to the same restriction as the driver of the horse. The
driver of the carriage and the bicycle have the same rights
and are subject to the same restrictions and penalties."
Observe how neatly the court reads into the act the words
which the legislature did not put there, and which, in view of
their importance, and the nature of the subject, they must be
held to have omitted intentionally! There could not be a
clearer case of judicial legislation.
In the second place, the act of April 23 subjects the bicycler
only to such restrictions as are imposed by law,-that is, to
existing restrictions, not future ones. Again, if the legislature
had intended to subject the riders of bicycles to future as well
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as existing restrictions, it would have beeil very easy to have
done so by making the act read "are or shall be prescribed by
law." This would have avoided all question. But they did
not do so ; and not having done so, tle court cannot, except
in a clear case, do it for them.
Now, in regard to these two objections, it must be borne in
mind that whatever their intrinsic weight may be, it is
multiplied by the cardinal axiom of statutory construction,
that a penal statute is to be construed strictly. The spirit of
such a statute is not to be loosely held, at the pleasure of the
court, to include cases not expressed. It was entirely within
the power of the legislature to make the act of April 23
inc.ude future as well as existing restrictions, and to make the
bicycler subject to liabilities as well as restrictions; but it did
not do so : and no ccurt has power to do for the legislature
what it fails to do for itself. Such a decision as that in this
case is a gross abuse of the judicial powers.
But there is another aspect of the case which is very delicately dealt with by the court. It seems to have felt that
after all it was perilous to attempt to read the act of May 7
into the act of April 23 ; and it therefore expatiates at length
on the fact that the bicycler is within the spirit of the act of
May 7. This is the demonstration of the latter proposition.
,- It will scarcely be disputed that a bicycler is within the spirit
of the act. It is wholly improbable the legislature intended
to exempt him. The sidewalk is for foot travelers, men,
women and children. A very few years of observation and
experience in the new mode of traveling by bicycle has
resulted in the conclusion that this vehicle is fully as dangerous to those walking on the same road as the carriage drawn
by a horse. A carriage, with rider, weighing together two to
three hundred pounds; propelled with the speed of a trolley
car on a sidewalk, is full of peril to the life and limb of the
foot traveler. No bicycler,. with due regard to the safety
and rights of his fellows, should demand the use, in common
with foot travelers, of a walk, with such a vehicle; and
the intention of the legislature to debar him from such use
is manfest, not only from the terms of the two acts, when

PROGRESS

OF THE LAW.

read together, but also from the reason and spirit thatprompted
their passage."
The moral reflections that precede this last paragraph are
most excellent; but they neither lead to the conclusion italicized, nor do they offer any warrant for supplying an intention
that the legislature did not -manifest. The fact is, as a careful
examination of the act of May 7 will show, that the foot
traveler is not only not mentioned, but was the very last thing
in the mind of the legislature. The land-owner is empowered
by the first two sections to build a sidewalk along his land at
his own expense, using therefor the public highway, instead of
his own land; and the drivers of horses or carriages are
liable to penalty for driving thereon, because of the injury
they may do the sidewalk, and the consequent expense of
repair to the land-owner, not because of the danger to foot
travelers. The language of the act shows this clearly. " If
any person or persons shall wilfully and maliciously ride or
drive any horse or any other animal, upon or into any boardwalk or sidewalk or footway laid, erected or being on and
along the side of any road or highway in any township of
this Commonwealth, or shall otle-wise wilfully break, injure,
or destroy the same," etc. The word " otherwise " is the key
to the construction of the act. It shows that the intention of
the legislature was to protect the sidewalk, not the foot
traveler thereon, and since it cannot be seriously argued that
a bicycle can do damage to a sidewalk, bicyclers are therefore
not within the spirit of the act. It is to be hoped that the
next case of the kind will find the court in a better frame of
mind. Meanwhile, Mr. Forrest has had to suffer.
Judge RITCHIE, 'of the Superior Court of Baltimore, has
just decided a most interesting case of first impression, the
report of which we would like to print in full, if
Carriers,
Passengers,
space permitted. In it he holds that the purPullman
Sleeper,
chaser of a section in a Pullman sleeping car for
Transfer of
Tick~et

a given trip has the right on leaving the train

before he reaches his destination, to transfer the
use of his section to another first-class passenger, for the rest
of the trip for which it was sold.
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On grounds of public policy alone, an express 'contract
entered into between the mayor and council of a city and one
City Offis, who is at -the time a councilman of that city,.for
Contract with the performance of services for the city, will not
City , be -enforced, even though there be no penal statute
prohibiting the execution of such a contract. While it remains
executory, such a contract, though not absolutely void, may
be avoided by the city at will; but when it was entered into in
good faith, was for the doing of lawful and necessary work for
the city, and has, without objection, been fully executed, the
city receiving and retaining the benefit thereof, a recovery may
be had on a quantum meruit for what the services were
reasonably worth: City of Concordia v. Hagaman, (Court of
Appeals of Kansas), 41 Pac- Rep. 132.
So, in Capron v. Hitclcock, 98 Cal. 427.1 S. C., 33 Pac.
Rep. 43 1, under a statutory provision that no officer of a city
"shall be interested in any contract to which the city is a
party, and any contract contrary to the provisions hereof shall
be void," a contract by a city with one of its school directors
for street work was held void.
It is not necessary, however, that the interest of the officer
should be direct, in order to vitiate the contract. It will in
general be sufficient to avoid it, if the officer have only an
indirect interest therein, such as arises frombeing a member of
a firm or corporation with which the contract is made, or the
like: State v. Consumers' Water Co., (N. J.) 28 At. Rep.
578. Such a contract, however, may be ratified by a subsequent resolution of councils, passed after the officer has ceased
to be such; for the ratification is equivalent to a new contract:
Fort Wayne v. Lake Shore & Mich. South. Ry. Co., 132 Ind.
558; S. C., 32 N. E. Rep. 215.
The pet measures of the labor unions seem lately to have
met with scant favor at the hands of the courts; and it seemS)
Constitutional to speak ill for the intelligence and honesty of
Law,
the former bodies that such should be the case.
Employment
Judge WHITE, of the Superior Court of. Buffalo,
in Peo. v. Warren, 34 N. Y. Suppl. 942, has recently declared
of Aliens
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void the statute of New York of 1870, c. 385, § 2, as amended
by the act of 1894, c. 622, which makes it a crime for a contractor with a municipal corporation for'the construction of
public works to employ an alien as a laborer on such works.
This he holds to be in violation of the constitution of New
York, Art. I, § i, which provides that no citizen shall be
deprived of any of his rights or privileges unless by the law of
the land or the judgment of his peers, of Art. i, § 6, which
enacts that no person shall be deprived of liberty or property
without due process of law, and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which forbids
any state to make a law which shall abridge the privilege or
immunities of citizens of the United States, or to deprive any
person of liberty or property without due process of law; and
also violates the third article of the treaty between the United
States and Italy, which secures to resident Italians in the
United States the same rights and privileges as are secured to
our own citizens.
Further, the Supreme Court of Georgia has recently declared
unconstitutional the act of that state of 1891, Oct. i ; P. L
I88, which required railroad, express and teleCompelling
Disclosure of graph companies to give to their discharged emReasons for
Discharge of

Employes

ployes or agents the causes of their removal or
discharge, when discharged or removed, under

penalty for non-compliance. The grounds upon which the
decision rests are these: (I) Liberty of speech and of writing
is secured by the constitution, and the correlative liberty of
silence, not less important nor less sacred, is incident thereto;
(2) Statements or communications, oral or written, wanted
for private information, cannot be coerced by mere legislative
mandate at the will of one of the parties and against the will
of the other; (3) Compulsory private discovery, even from
corporations, enforced not by suit or action, but by the terror
of a statute, is not allowable when rights are already under the
guardianship of due process of law; (4) That granting that
the state may compel a discovery of matters in which it has an
interest, the public, whether as many or one, whethet as a multitude or as a sovereignty, has no interest to be protected or
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promoted by a correspondence between discharged agents or
employes and their late employers, designed notfor public but
for private -information,as to the reasons for discharges, and as
to the import and authorship of 'all complaints or communications which produced or uggested them; (5) That a statute
which attempts to make it the duty of a corporation to engage
in correspondence of this sort with its discharged agents and
employes, and which subjects them in each case to a heavy
forfeiture, under the name of damages, for failing or refusing
to do so, is violative of the' general private right of silence
enjoyed by all persons, natural or artificial, from time immemorial, and is therefore utterly void :. Wallace v. Ga., C. & N.
Ry. CO., 22 S. E. Rep. 579.

In Crall v. Toledo & Ohio Central Rj,. Co., 7 Ohio Cir. Ct.
132, it was decided that under the statutes of Ohio, requiring
railway companies to furnish in writing, on demand of a discharged employe, the reasons for his discharge, but not
declaring a refusal to do so unlawful, an employe could not
maintain an action for the penalty prescribed for an offence
against the act. The question of constitutionality was not
raised, and, in view of the above decision, that could not easily
have been done.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which-is nothing if not
original, has just held that the legislature has the power to
pass a law limiting the number of candidates for
Limited,
Vote at

Elections

office for which a voter can cast his ballot, when
there are several to be elected to the same office

at the same time. In order to support its decision, it has had
recourse to a new principle of constitutional construction,
which had escaped the sages of the law hitherto-that of the
policy of the constitution. Observe the logic of this paragraph !-"A limited voting plan was recognized and adopted in
the constitution because it was deemed wise that, as to offices
non-partisan in character, or which at least should be, the
minority party ought to have representation, and this could
only be attained by limiting voting. "Does the expression of
this thing necessarily exclude other things not expressed?
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As the same reasons for the plan exist as to like offices
thereafter created, is not a necessary deduction that a like plan
to that expressed should be followed? Does not the whole
spirit of the constitution plainly so imply, while there is not a
word indicating that such plan as to other or new courts is
forbidden ? In the case specified the constitution is mandatory. It says to the legislature in thias enumerating them,
'Thou shalt prescribe the limited voting plan.' In the cases
not enumerated it is discretionary."
Comment on such language is needless.
The Supreme Court, of Pennsylvania has recently ruled,
that since the constitution of that state, Art. I, § 18, declares
Criminal Law, that no person shall be attainted of felony, and § 19
provides that no attainder shall 'work corruption
Attainder,
Parricide,
of blood, nor forfeiture of estate, except during the
Inheritance

life of the offender, and since the statute of descent
and distribution enacts that on the death of a person his estate
shall vest in his children, in the absence of a will, a son who
murders his father in order to get immediate possession of his
share of the father's estate becomes vested with that share, in
the absence of a will: In re Carpenter's Estate, 32 Atl.
Rep. 637. WILLIAMS, J., dissented from this ruling, saying
tersely, "The son could not, by his own felony, acquire the
property of his father, and be protected by the law in the
possession of the fruits of his crime."
The decision of the majority seems to be in accord with the
consensus of opinion. The only exception is in New York,
where, in Riggs v. Palmer, I15 N. Y. 506 ; S. C., 22 N. E.
Rep. 188, it was held that whcn a beneficiary under a will, in
order that he might prevent revocation of the provision in his
favor, and obtain the speedy enjoyment and possession of the
property, wilfully murdered the testator, he was, by reason of
his crime, deprived of any-interest in the estate left by his
victim, and therefore was not entitled to the property either
as donee under the will or as heir or next of kin, supporting
this conclusion by the never before heard of proposition, that
all laws, as well as contracts, may be controlled in their
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operation and effect by these general fundamental maxims of
the common law, viz.: No one shall be permitted to profit by
his own fraud, to take advantage of his own wrong, to found
any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his
-own crime. But the court prudently omitted to cite any
authority for such a doctrine, except some broad rules of
statutory construction which had no proper application to. the
case in hand. The decision is thus caustically criticised in
Deem v. .Millikin, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 357: "It must be admitted
that the most careful examination of Riggs v. Palmerfails to
discover any clearly stated and clearly applicable principle
justifying the decision. The spirit of fearless inquiry was
exorcised early in the opinion, when every one contemplating
a conclusion different from that reached by the majority was
warned that if he should persevere, it would be disparagingly
said of him ' qui Izaeret in litera haeret in cortice.' "
Accordingly, it has been held in England that a wife who
has murdered her husband is entitled to her share of his estate;
Cleaverv. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., [1892] I Q. B. 147;
in North Carolina, that a widow convicted as accessory before
the fact to her husband's murder is entitled to dower in his
lands: Owens v. Owens, ioo N. C. 240; S. C., 6 S. E. Rep.
794; in Ohio, that a child who murders his parent can inherit
his estate: Deem v. Millikin, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 357.- and in
Nebraska, that a father who murders his daughter inherits
from her: Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631; S. C., 59
N. W. Rep. 935, reversing 31 Neb. 6I; S. C., 47 N. W. Rep.
700. In the last case cited, the court was misled by a failure
to closely criticise the case of Riggs v. Palmer,on which it
rested its decision, and it very freely acknowledges that fact,
and points out the fundamental error of Riggs v. Palmer, in
the opinion on rehearing, in 41 Neb. 631; S. C., 59 N. W.
Rep. 935.
It is true that the beneficiary in a life insurance policy cannot recover, if he has feloniously caused the death of the
assured, nor can his assignee do so: New York Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 ; S.C., 6 Sup. Ct. Rep.
.877; but this is because the right in such a case is founded
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upon contract, not upon law. This very point was admitted
by the Court of Appeal in Cleaverv. MutualReserve FundLife
Assn., [1892] I Q. B. 147, while at the same time it held
that as the wife could not take by reason of her crime, the
insurance money became part of the estate of the insured,
and went to her as his legal representative.
An instrument given by a father to his children, in form an
absolute deed, and executed as such, but not attested as a
will is required to be, which contains the followDeed,
Title to Vest ing clause, "provided always, and it is expressly
after Death of
Grantor,
Et

understood and agreed, that this conveyance is not
to take effect till after my death, and that, at my
death, the title to the foregoing lands is to vest immediately
in my said children," will be construed as a deed reserving a
life estate to the grantor, if it was delivered when executed,
and the grantor lived on the land with the grantees until his
death, without attempting to make any other disposition of
the land: Abney v. Moore, (Supreme Court of Alabama,) 18
So. Rep. 6o.
There is a full annotation on this subject in i Ari. L. REG.
& REV. (N. S.) 14o.
The uncertainty as to the validity of irregularly marked
ballots under the Australian Ballot system still continues.
The Supreme Court of California is the latest to
Elections,
Ballots,
pass upon this question. In Tebbe v. Smith, 41
Marking
Pac. Rep. 454, that court, while holding that the
provisions as to the marking of ballots are in general mandatory, yet concludes that under the laws of that state, which
provide (i) That there shall be a margin on the ballot onehalf inch wide, at the right hand of the names, so that the
voter may clearly indicate, in a manner afterwards provided.
the candidate for whom he votes, and that the clerk shall
have printed in it, "To vote for a person, stamp a cross (x) in
the square at the right of the name;" (Pol. Code Cal. § 1197;)
(2) That the voter shall prepare his ballot by making a cross
after the name of the person for whom he intends to vote;
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(Pol. Code Cal. § 1205;) (3) That any ballot not made as
provided in the act shall be void, and shall not be counted;
(Pol. Code Cal. § 1211 ;) and (4) That no voter shall place any
mark upon his ballot by which it may be afterwards identified
as the one voted by him; (Pol. Code Cal. § 1215 ;)-that
though the statute impliedly requires the printing of a square
for the cross-mark at the right of the name of each candidate, yet as it does not expressly so provide, that requirement
cannot be considered as making it mandatory on the voter to
mark in the square; and therefore ballots with crosses placed
opposite the candidate's name, but without the square, should
be counted as votes for the candidate opposite whose name the
mark is placed; but a ballot with the letter "J" written in
pencil in the blank space left for the insertion of the name for
an office is void, and should not be counted.
In the same election, there appeared on all the ballots cast,
written on the blank space under the office of justice of the
Republican." The
peace, "G. G. Brown,
Written In

same

Hand-

writing

evidence showed that the writing was all done by

the same person, but did not show who did the
writing, nor whether it was on the tickets when

they were put in the voters' hands, and that there was but one
person in the precinct lawfully assisted in marking his ballot;
and it was accordingly held that these ballots, except the one
of the voter lawfully assisted, were not made as provided by
the ballot act, and should therefore be rejected, under § 121 1
of the Political Code.
It was also decided in this case, that under Pol. Code Cal.
§§ I I6o, I162, which provide that the polls shall
Time of
OpeningPolls, be opened at sunrise, and be kept open till 5 P. A.,
Removal of and that a ballot box must not be removed from
Ballot Box

the polls, in the presence of bystanders, the votes
cast at a precinct where the polls were not opened until IO
A. M., and the ballot box was taken by the election officers
with them to dinner, are void, and should not be counted.
However, in Tfojer v. Van de Vanter, 41 Pac. Rep. 6o, the
Supreme Court of Washington has decided that the statute
of that state, (Gen. Stat. Wash. § 391,) which provides that
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any ballot not indorsed by the official stamp and the initials
of an inspector or a judge of election shall not be counted, is
in conflict with the provisions of the constitution, (Const.
Wash. Art. 6, §§ I & 6,) which declare that all persons possessing the requisite qualifications shall be entitled to vote at
all elections, and that all elections shall be by ballot.
The cases on the subject of ballot marking will be found in
I AM. L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 748; 2 Amt. L. REG. & REV.
(N. S.) 85, 155, 222, 491, 556.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Benny v. O'Brien, 32
Atl. Rep. 698, has recently been obliged to reaffirm the rule
Citizenship of citizenship which prevailed at common law, and
by Birth
was enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, that all persons born in the
United States of parents domiciled here are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside, with the
exception of children born of persons resident here in the
diplomatic service of foreign governments.
In Lynch v. Clarke, I Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 583, a child, born
in New York of alien parents, during their temporary sojourn
in that city, who returned with them the same year to their
native country, and thereafter always resided there, was held
to be a citizen of the United States, following the rule of the
common law, that all persons, born within the king's allegiance, become subjects, whatever the situation of their
parents.
In In re Look Tin Sing, Io Sawy. 353 ; S. C., 21 Fed. Rep.
9o5, Justice FIELD held that a person born within the United
States, of Chinese parents residing therein, and not engaged in
any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of
China, is a citizen of the United States. The same was decided
in Ex parte Chin King, 35 Fed. Rep. 354; In re Yung Sing
Hee, 36 Fed. Rep. 437; In re Wy S/zing, 36 Fed. Rep. 553;
Gee Fook Sing v. United States, 49 Fed. Rep. 146. But this
rule does not apply to the citizens of independent political
communities existing within the borders of a larger state, even
though the latter exercises a protectorate over them; and
therefore a child born of Indian, or of Indian and alien parents,
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is not a citizen of the United States, though born within its
territory: Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94; S. C., 5 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 41 ; McKay v. Williams, 2 Sawy. i 18.
In Denver ConsolidatedElectric Co. v. Simpson, 41 Pac. Rep.
499, the Supreme Court of Colorado has very clearly defined
Electric
Wires,
Negligence

the responsibility of a company which maintains
electric wires in a public highway. Like other
persons using instrumentalities which may become

dangerous to others if misused, they are'only bound to exercise that reasonable care which a reasonably prudent person
would exercise under similar circumstances; but, as "thebusiness is attended with great peril to the public, the care to
be exercised is commensurate with the increased danger.
Accordingly, evidence that the wire of an electric light company, so highly charged .'ith electricity as to be dangerous to
persons coming in contact with it, is detached from its fastenings and hangs down in an alley, so as to endanger public
travel, it is prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of
the company; and if degrees of negligence are not recognized,
ar. instruction that the company is bound to use the highest
degree of care in the maintenahce and construction of its
wires is not a prejudicial error.
It was also decided in the same case, that the fact that a
complaint for injury.caused by coming in contact with a wire
belonging to an electric light company contains
Pleading,
Surplusage
allegations assuming that the defendant company
is an absolute insurer of the public against injury by its wires
will not render it bad on that ground, when it also alleges that
the location and defective condition of the wire in question
was due to negligence of the defendant in the building of its
line and keepingit in repair.
The Supreme Court of •Vermont has lately held, that when
the water of a stream running through a farm is taken by a
village for its waterworks, the owner is entitled
Eminent
Domain,
not only to damages for being deprived of the
Appropriation
of Water,

Damages to

water for farm purposes, but also to damages
for being deprived of the opportunity to sell

Owner

water rights to prospective purchasers of village
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lots plotted out for sale in a part of the farm: Bridgeman v.
Village of Hardwick, 32 Atl. Rep. 502.
In Strachan v. Uiziersal Stock Exchange, Ltd., [i 89 i] 2
Q. B. 329, an action brought to recover back securities deposited
Gambnng
as margin for differences which might arise on gamContract,
Wager,

lecovery,

bling transactions in stocks and shares, the Court of
Appeal of England has recently held, that the Gain-

ing Act of that country of 1845, which enacts that
" no suit shall be brought or maintained in any
court of law or equity for recovering any sum of money or
which shall have been deposited
other valuable thing ....
in the hands of any person to abide the event on which any
wager shall have been made," applies only to money or valuable things deposited as the stake- to abide the event of a
wager, and does not apply to money or valuable things
deposited as security for the observance by the loser of the
terms of the wagering contract; and that the authority to
retain the securities may be revoked and the securities recovered back at any time before the holders have appropriated
them to their own use.
Stock
Gambling

In a recent case, State v. Dyer, 32 Atl. Rep. 814, the
Supreme Court of Vermont has laid down several valuable
rules with regard to the prosecution of members
Labor
Unions,
Conspiracy

of a labor union for conspiracy to drive a mechanic

out of his employment.

The reason of their

action was that the mechanic would not join a union. The
information for conspiracy charged that its purpose was to
prevent the mechanic " from obtaining work or employment or
continuing in said work and employment" with a certain corporation, " or in any other shops or works ;" and this was
held not to be bad, as charging offences in the alternative,
since the information also alleged that the mechanic was an
employe of the corporation when the conspiracy originated.
There was evidence that all the persons charged were members of the union; that the mechanic was compelled by them,
as members of the union, to quit his employment; that one
of the accused was secretary, and recorded the minutes of an
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executive meeting at which a report of the mechanic's case
-was made, and at that meeting was appointed as one of a
committee to investigate the trouble, and subsequently acted
as suzh; and it was accordingly held that the secretary was a
conspirator.
On the trial of this case, conversations between certain of
the conspirators and one with whom the mechanic, ifter being
driven from his employment, had engaged to work, takingplace a week after the mechanic had been driven from his
first employment, which connected the alleged conspirators
with the conspiracy, and in which the employer stated that he
canceled his agreement to employ the mechanic when he
heard that he had been compelled by the union to leave his
first employment, and gave the reasons the mechanic gave for
not joining the union, were held admissible in evidence, as a
part of the principal act.
It is a corollary of the doctrine that the concurrent negligence of a driver is not to be imputed to a passenger who
has no control or authority over him, that the
Negligence,
passenger is also not to be held chargeable with
Stop, Look
and Listen,
Passenger
in Vehicle

personal negligence for a failure to stop, look and
listen when approaching a railway crossing; for he

cannot compel the driver to stop, and is under no obligation to
,jump out of the vehicle. Accordingly, it has been lately decided
by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, that when the plaintiff
was riding at the invitation of the owner, in a wagon owned
and driven by another, having no control over the driver or
his management of the team, not standing to the driver in the
relation of master to servant, or principal to agent, and not
being engaged in a common enterprise with him, and there
being no evidence that the plaintiff knew that the driver was
incompetent or was not keeping a proper lookout for trains at
the crossing, the former could not be charged with either
imputed or personal negligence as matter of law, but that the
question was one of fact for the jury, although it appeared that
if the plaintiff had exercised the degree of vigilance in "looking and listening" required of one in control and management
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of a team, he would have discovered the approaching train in
time to have avoided injury: Howe v. Minneapolis, St. P. &
S. S. M. Ry. Co., 64 N. W. Rep. 102.
A similar conclusion was reached in O'Toole v. Pittsburgh
& Lake Erie R. R. Co., 158 Pa. 99; S. C., 27 Atl. Rep. 737,
where the court held that a passenger in a street car approaching a grade crossing of a railroad is under no obligation to
look out and listen for approaching locomotives, or to jump
off the car in apprehension of a possible collision. These
cases are in apparent conflict with those which hold that the
passenger is chargeable with negligence if he remains in the
vehicle with knowledge of impending danger: Brickell v. N. Y.
Cent. & Hudson R. R. R. Co., 120 N. Y. 290; S. C., 24 N. E.
Rep. 449; Dean v. PennsylvaniaR. R. Co., 129 Pa. 514; S. C.,
18 Atl. Rep. 718. But the fact is that in both the cases cited
the decision is made to cover more ground than the circumstances would warrant. In the New York case, the plaintiff
and the driver were on the same seat of a top buggy, the top
of which was raised, which prevented them from seeing anything except in front, and there was a snowstorm in progress
at the time. These facts made the danger of collision greater,
and therefore imposed on the plaintiff the duty of at least
cautioning the driver to be careful. There was no evidence
that he did this, and he was accordingly held not to have
freed himself from the suspicion of negligence. Similarly, in
the Pennsylvania case, the plaintiff knew that he was approaching the crossing at a fast trot, (in other words, that the driver
was acting negligently,) and yet took no precautions himself.
But there was no effectual precaution he could have taken,.
except to remonstrate with the driver. Here, then, lies the
distinction. If the passenger looks for a train, when approaching a crossing, or requests the driver to go carefully, he has
done all he can do, and cannot be charged with personal
negligence. If he neglects to do so, he is so chargeable.
Now, in the Howe case, the evidence showed that the plaintiff
did look and saw nothing; so that the case is different in that
respect from the two last cited from New York and Pennsylvania, and there is therefore no conflict between them.
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According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
:Pennsylvania, farms purchased and permanently used by a
hospital for hospital purposes, as part of the
Taxation,
Exemption, hospital plant, and as an open air sanitarium, in
Hospital
actual operation for such purposes, are exempt
Farms

from taxation as a part of the hospital property,
though separated from the main hospital, used for hospital
purposes only during the summer months, and operated incidentally for profit in order to reduce expenses: Contributors
Jo Pennsylvania Hospital v. Delaware Co., 32 Atl. Rep. 456.
Judge CHITTY, of the Chancery Division of England, has
lately held, that a child en ventre sa mre is to be considered
Devise, will, as living so as to vest in the parent on the death
Issue Living, of the life tenant a devise made by a testator to
4hild en ven-

tre sa Mere A. for life, and on her death to the
child, "for her absolute use and benefit in case
living at the death" of A., " but in case she has
living," then over, when the parent was enceinte
A.'s death: In re Burrows, [1895] 2 Ch. 497.

parent of the
she has issue
no issue then
at the time of

